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Case Report for September 9, 2011 |
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Appellant: Glenda
J. Williams Agency: Office of Personnel
Management Decision Number: 2011
MSPB 81 Docket Number:
SF-0831-11-0048-I-1 Issuance Date:
September 2, 2011 Action Type:
Retirement/Benefit Matter Survivor Annuity – Dependent Child The appellant
petitioned for review of an initial decision that affirmed OPM’s
reconsideration decision denying her application for a survivor annuity under
the Civil Service Retirement System.
She applied for benefits as a dependent of her deceased father, who
was a federal employee prior to his death in 1966, at which time the
appellant was 12 years old. The
appellant requested a survivor annuity in 2009 as a dependent child under 5 U.S.C.
§ 8341(a)(4)(B), which provides for a
survivor annuity for an “unmarried dependent child regardless of age
who is incapable of self-support because of mental or physical disability
incurred before age 18.” The
appellant is currently legally blind, and presented evidence that the
degenerative eye disease from which she suffers was inherited at birth. After a hearing, the administrative judge
determined that the appellant did not meet the legal requirements for the
benefit she sought. Holdings: The Board affirmed the
initial decision as modified, still sustaining OPM’s reconsideration
decision: 1. One of the circumstances in
which the statutory right to a dependent child annuity terminates is when the
child “ceases to be . . . a
student after becoming 18 years of age unless he is then incapable of
self-support.” 2. The administrative judge
correctly determined that the appellant was capable of self-support after she
completed 1-2 years as a college student after she turned 18. Appellant: Sylvia
M. Kitt Agency: Department of the Navy Decision Number: 2011
MSPB 82 Docket Number:
AT-0752-07-0985-C-1 Issuance Date:
September 2, 2011 Appeal Type:
Adverse Action by Agency Case Type:
Compliance Compliance – Settlement-Related The appellant
petitioned for review of an initial decision that denied her petition for
enforcement of a settlement agreement.
In the underlying appeal of a removal action, the parties entered into
a written settlement agreement that provided that the agency would
“change the nature of Employee’s Standard Form 50
. . . from Removal to a 30-days Suspension.” By letter the following year, the agency
informed the appellant that she was being denied a security clearance, in
part because her history included the fact that her command “issued
[her] a Notice of Removal from federal service” and because her
“employment records” reflect that she received a 30-day
suspension. In her petition for
enforcement, the appellant asserted that the agency breached the agreement
because documentation of her removal remained in her Official Personnel File
(OPF). Relying on Cutrufello v. U.S. Postal Service, 56
M.S.P.R. 99 (1992), the administrative judge determined that the agency
had not breached the settlement agreement because the agreement did not
include any language requiring the agency to expunge the removal from the
appellant’s OPF or other records.
Holdings: The Board granted the
appellant’s petition for review, found that the agency had breached the
settlement agreement, and remanded the case to the regional office for
further adjudication: 1. Although this case is
analogous to Cutrufello,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reached a different result
in a later case with similar facts, Conant
v. Office of Personnel Management, 255
F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The
court there held that, by agreeing to “rescind” the original
removal SF-50 and issue a new one reflecting a resignation for personal
reasons, the agency in effect promised to destroy the original SF-50 and
remove it from the employee’s record. 2. Here, where the agency agreed
to “change” the nature of action on the SF-50 from a removal to a
suspension, and provided no express language permitting other disclosures of
the removal, it was agreeing to remove any record of the appellant’s
removal. Accordingly, the agency
breached the settlement agreement. 3. The breach was a material one,
i.e., it related to a matter of vital importance or went to the essence of
the contract. 4. When one party commits a
material breach of a settlement agreement, the other party is entitled to
either enforce the settlement agreement or to rescind it and to reinstate her
appeal. The appeal was remanded to the
regional office to afford the appellant an opportunity to make an informed
decision regarding these options. |
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